“An umbrella full of holes?” : Corporate Restructuring, Redundancy and the Effectiveness of ICE Regulations by Taylor, Phil et al.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"“An umbrella full of holes?”: Corporate Restructuring, Redundancy and the Effectiveness of ICE
Regulations"
 
Phil Taylor, Chris Baldry, Andy Danford et Paul Stewart
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 64, n° 1, 2009, p. 27-49.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/029537ar
DOI: 10.7202/029537ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 05:42
“An umbrella full of holes?”
Corporate Restructuring, 
Redundancy and the Effectiveness  
of ICE Regulations
Phil Taylor, Chris Baldry, Andy Danford and Paul Stewart
this article concerns the manner in which the European Union information and 
Consultation of Employees (iCE) directive has been implemented in the UK in the 
harsh corporate conditions of restructuring, redundancy and site closure. drawing 
on interview and documentary evidence from six case companies (Peugeot-Citroën, 
General Motors, Prudential, aviva, Marconi, rolls-royce), the article exposes major 
fault lines in the effectiveness of the UK’s iCE regulations to provide even limited 
protection for employees who were presented with redundancy as a fait accompli. 
Contrary to management claims, iCE arrangements have not provided additional 
levels of representation either to complement unions or to fill the “representation 
gap” left by declining coverage. the failure to consult raises broader questions on 
the wider political and legislative environment in the UK. 
KEYWordS: European Union, information and consultation of employees, UK, plant 
closure
introduction 
This article concerns the manner in which the European Union (EU) Information and 
Consultation of Employees (ICE) Directive has been implemented in the UK. The evidence 
presented here raises significant questions over the intentions and behaviour of UK firms 
regarding the ICE Regulations. We take what on the surface seems to be a benign, even 
innocuous, HR-related public policy imperative and test its benefit and utility in the harsh 
and conflict-ridden corporate circumstances of restructuring and large-scale redundancy. 
Data from six case study companies challenges the optimism that accompanied the 
statutory implementation in the UK of the ICE Regulations in April 2005.1 
At the outset it is necessary to provide some background to the ICE Regulations. 
Enactment was widely heralded as being an important development in UK employment 
law that would have considerable significance for industrial relations (Hall, 2006). 
The Trades Union Congress (TUC) exemplified the conviction that positive outcomes 
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would follow for employee representation and union organization. Indeed, the TUC 
claimed that the ICE Regulations could lead “to the biggest change in workplace 
relations for a generation” (Hall, 2005: 103). Such optimism was rooted in the fact 
that the Regulations established for the first time in the UK a statutory framework 
giving employees the right to be informed and consulted by their employers on a 
range of business, employment and restructuring issues. 
The existing literature on the ICE Regulations, notably that by Hall (2005; 2006) and 
Hall and Terry (2004), provides an excellent platform for understanding the purpose, 
nature and detail of the Regulations. This work has delivered valuable insights into 
the anticipated and initial responses of both employers and unions. Nevertheless, 
in such early attempts to offer an “interim assessment” of the ICE Regulations, the 
tenor understandably has been speculative and the conclusions necessarily provisional 
(Hall, 2006). Three years after enforcement, though, we are better placed to marshal 
empirical evidence on outcomes.
The intention here is not to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the ICE Regulations 
in respect of the extent of coverage, the detail of arrangements and so on, but rather to 
alter the prism through which their efficacy is evaluated. Arguably, a principal measure of 
the Regulations’ value should reside in their effectiveness in conditions of restructuring, 
redundancy and site closure. It should be recalled that it was Renault’s precipitate closure 
of the Vilvoorde plant in Belgium in 1997, exposing loopholes in national legislation 
and the European regulatory framework on collective redundancy and worker rights, 
that prompted the European Commission (EC) to formulate the ICE Directive (http://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/03/feature/be9703202f.html). Thus the existing 
UK Regulations originated in the EU’s attempt to prevent “shock” redundancies and to 
ensure that employees and their representatives would be informed and consulted on 
major decisions affecting the security and conditions of their employment. The intention 
was to create a regulatory framework in which they might be able to influence outcomes 
through presenting alternatives to company proposals.
Conceptually, this paper presents an interesting opportunity to contrast the 
assumptions and consequences of the neo-liberal labour market model currently held 
by the UK with the “Social Market” model of continental Europe. The long history of 
statutory employee rights in most European states was integrated and made a key 
plank in the formation of the Single European Market in 1992. The Maastricht Treaty 
setting up the Single Market had included a Social Chapter covering areas such as 
employment security, health and safety, working time and rights to information and 
consultation (Ramsay, 1991). EU policy thinking was that, firstly, a single market in 
labour should be based on a harmonization of employment conditions and secondly, 
that competition within Europe should be tempered by a concern with the employment 
and social conditions of Europe’s citizens (Addison and Siebert, 1992; Baldry, 1994; 
Streeck, 1994). What this has meant in practice is, not that there have been no 
collective redundancies, but that it is more usual for employee representatives (through 
the unions or works councils) to be jointly involved in discussions (“social dialogue” in 
EU terminology) over how the redundancies or closures are to be handled, the terms of 
compensation and support for finding alternative employment. 
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British governments, with no prior history of positive employment rights, 
distanced themselves wherever possible from such thinking, even refusing, under 
the Conservatives, to sign the Social Chapter (Cressey, Gill and Gold, 1997). For the 
past decade British Labour Governments, firmly embracing a neo-liberal agenda, 
have themselves implicitly contrasted the benefits to employers of Britain’s “flexible 
labour market” with the perceived rigidities of more highly regulated EU member 
states such as France and Germany (Barnard, Deakin and Hobbs, 2003). Essentially, 
and as seen by the unions, this comes down to the fact that it has been much easier 
and cheaper to make collective redundancies in Britain than in other EU countries. 
Thus the ICE Regulations were seen by the TUC and its affiliates as offering some 
hope that, as with health and safety and working time, some aspects of Social 
Europe would be imported to the UK, to their members’ benefit.
In this article, using a case study methodology, we examine the role which the 
ICE Regulations played during the process of restructuring and redundancy in four 
UK employment sectors and show that their efficacy in ameliorating redundancy has 
been extremely limited. The research on which this paper is based was prompted by 
trade union (specifically Amicus2) concerns regarding the apparent inability of the 
UK’s Regulations to protect members from corporate restructuring and the unilateral 
exercise of managerial prerogative. Evidence is evaluated from six case study 
companies of both historical and contemporary significance to the UK economy: 
motor vehicle manufacturing (Peugeot-Citroën, General Motors), financial services 
(Prudential, Aviva), electronics (Marconi) and aerospace/engineering (Rolls-Royce). 
Case selection was stimulated largely by the incidence of significant job loss3 since 
the Regulations’ enactment. Principal lines of inquiry included: the extent to which 
companies pre-empted the Regulations and established Information and Consultation 
prior to April 2005; the nature of arrangements, if any, subsequently introduced; and 
the implications for the processes and substance of collective bargaining following 
enactment, particularly where new ICE arrangements were established. Finally, 
there were questions regarding the impact of the Regulations on employers’ actions 
and, crucially, of the extent to which employees and unions were informed of, and 
involved in consultation over, corporate restructuring proposals. 
The article is structured, first, to provide synopses of the EU Directive and, following 
transposition, of the UK’s Regulations, indicating potential weaknesses for workers 
and unions. A brief explication of research methods and data sources is followed 
by an evaluation of the empirical evidence. The two motor manufacturing cases 
are considered together, as are those in financial services, while those in electronics 
and aerospace/engineering are assessed separately. The evidence is unequivocal that 
employers failed to inform and consult, contradicting the rhetoric surrounding the 
ICE Regulations and the intention of the I & C Directive. The fact that decisions to 
effect redundancies were effectively a fait accompli challenges optimistic expectations 
that the Regulations would expand union and employee influence over corporate 
decision-making. We conclude with general observations relating the information and 
consultation provisions to Labour’s employment legislation framework as dominated 
by the influence of neo-liberalism (Smith and Morton, 2006). 
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the eu information and Consultation of  
employees’ directive 
The UK’s ICE Regulations derived from the EC Directive on Information and Consultation 
in the Workplace, which required Member States to establish “a general framework 
setting out minimum requirements for the right to information and consultation” 
(Article 1), ensuring that employers consult employees over potential changes in their 
employment. Article 4 laid out employers’ obligations on information provision which 
included: recent and probable development of an undertaking’s (or establishment’s) 
economic situation; the situation, structure and probable development of employment 
or anticipatory measures, particularly where there are threats to employment; 
decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organization or contractual 
relations; information to be provided timeously to enable employees’ representatives 
to prepare for consultation (Hayes, 2004). Consultation requirements included 
enabling employee representatives to meet with the employer, who must provide 
responses to opinions they might formulate, with a view to reaching agreement on 
decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organization or contractual 
relations. Significantly, Article 5 emphasized that practical arrangements were to 
be defined and implemented by Member States in accordance with their national 
law and industrial relations practice. Similarly, Member States would determine 
the “adequate” administrative or judicial procedures, appropriate measures in the 
event of non-compliance and “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” penalties in 
circumstances of the infringement of the Directive (Article 7).
Several critical observations can be made of these objectives. Firstly, despite the 
apparently unambiguous prescription of employees’ rights, there is, as in other EU 
Directives (for example the Directive on Working Time), little structural detail about 
what amounts to a set of general objectives. Secondly, the I & C Directive essentially 
does not embrace co-determination (Smith and Morton, 2006: 409) and marks a 
further shift along the participation spectrum from those conceptions of industrial 
democracy based on worker rights to softer employer-led forms of employee 
involvement (Blyton and Turnbull, 2004; Hall and Marginson, 2005; Hyman and 
Mason, 1995). Thirdly, given the latitude accorded Member States in determining 
arrangements, the transposition process can prove additionally decisive in determining 
any Directive’s impact. 
uK Government, the iCe directive and regulations 
From the outset, the UK Labour government threatened to stymie the I & C Directive’s 
promise “to fill the gaps and counter the shortcomings … in the employee information 
and consultation provisions” (Memorandum accompanying Draft Directive, 1998). 
Labour opposed the attempt to overcome this statutory deficit,4 consistently blocking 
the I & C Directive’s introduction (Labour Research, 2000), arguing that it would 
“cut across existing practices in member states to no benefit” and was “difficult 
to reconcile with subsidiarity” (Hall, 2005: 108). It was only after the dissolution of 
the “blocking minority” (Denmark, Germany, Ireland, UK) that the UK government 
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abandoned its opposition in principle, leading ultimately to the Directive’s adoption in 
2002 (Hall et al., 2002). Subsequently, the government was prominent in successful 
attempts to dilute the original draft Directive by removing the obligation on employers 
to inform and consult, and widening the scope given to social partners to negotiate 
arrangements. It also omitted the Commission’s proposed approach to sanctions for 
non-compliance, under which the “legal effect of restructuring decisions taken by 
employers in serious breach of their information and consulting obligations would be 
suspended” (Hall, 2005: 108). 
Transposition produced further dilution. Significantly, the government prefaced 
discussions on the proposed Regulations with a distinct set of political-economic values 
and assumptions. Specifically, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) advocated a 
version of ICE predicated, not on extending employee rights, but on advocacy of the 
“High Performance Workplace” (DTI, 2002), linking economic success to employee 
involvement. This amounted to a straightforward HRM position in which enhanced 
consultation creates a climate of trust, which induces greater commitment to an 
organization’s goals and thus improves performance. However, for the employers’ 
body, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), even a modest commitment 
to employee involvement went too far (CBI, 2002). In rejecting the claim that ICE 
was necessary for improved performance, it restated its opposition to any kind of 
European stakeholder model and to the UK government’s commitment to partnership. 
Its preference was for direct consultation that excluded employee representatives 
or trade unions. These were preconditions for maintaining the “strength” of the 
UK’s flexible labour markets. Reflecting the pressure to adopt minimalist principles, 
a further document (DTI, 2003) established parameters for concluding consultation 
with the CBI and TUC. The outcome was an agreed framework, which differed little 
from the final version of the ICE Regulations.5 
Although constraints of space prohibit detailed analysis, it is necessary to emphasize 
some implications arising from the main provisions. Most importantly, the government 
delivered maximum flexibility for employers who are not obliged to conform to the 
sprit of the original I & C Directive. Rather the Regulations’ “trigger mechanisms” 
permit employers not to act unless 10% of employees request negotiations on an 
I & C agreement. In a similar vein, and responding to the CBI’s appeal for managerial 
discretion, the government encouraged parties “to develop their own arrangements 
tailored to their particular circumstances though voluntary agreements” (ACAS, 
2004). The expectation was that employers would prefer the voluntary Previously 
Existing Agreements (PEA) route, which provided numerous advantages over 
negotiated agreements and standard provisions, not least the fact that PEAs are 
not legally binding, have no remedy at the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) 
and can be concluded at any point before the date of a valid employee request to 
initiate negotiations. PEAs assist employers in “effectively pre-empting the use of the 
Regulations’ statutory procedures (significantly higher thresholds of employee support 
being required to trigger new negotiations where undertakings have PEAs in place)” 
(Hall, 2006: 459–460). Even when the statutory negotiating procedure is invoked, the 
I & C Regulations stress the importance of enterprise-specific agreements. 
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The Regulations are non-prescriptive concerning the terms of either PEAs or 
negotiated agreements. Diverse outcomes are possible, including the company 
council, Joint Consultative Committee model, or union-based arrangements. While 
no explicit reference was made to direct forms of information and consultation, they 
were implicitly conceded since, “The parties to a negotiated agreement will be able 
to agree the information and consultation arrangements that best suit their needs 
and agreements” (Hall, 2005: 110). Nor do the Regulations accord specific statutory 
rights to unions, which have been “written out of the script” of the standard I & C 
provisions under which representatives must be directly elected by workplace ballot. 
Of course, unions do have potential roles: negotiating and approving PEAs, acting as 
negotiating reps (albeit at the employer’s discretion) and standing as candidates for 
I & C bodies. Further, the Regulations offer unions the chance of gaining footholds 
as elected I & C representatives in non-recognized areas (Labour Research, 2004). 
Consequently, unions generally welcomed the Regulations as contributing to the 
democratization of the workplace or at least to creating more socially responsible 
employer-employee agendas. Yet fears existed that ICE would deliver only post facto 
information about company intent or would undermine collective agreements “by 
setting up separate workplace councils for information and consultation” (Unison, 
2005). For many, “the jury is still out” and it is only through case law and concrete 
experience that the cautious expectations will be tested. 
Academic commentary overall is less sanguine. Davis and Kilpatrick believe that 
the Regulations have “disconnected union-based structures from the representative 
structures of information and consultation” (2004: 141), giving statutory support 
to a second channel of communication from which unions are excluded, even 
where they are recognized or possess members. For Smith and Morton (2006: 409) 
this is unprecedented and contrasts markedly with existing issue-specific statutory 
consultation, by allowing employers to determine the boundaries of I & C procedures 
to fill the “representation gap.” Further, as Moore, McKay and Bewley (2004: 82) 
argue, employer-dominated consultative bodies may weaken or displace union 
organization. As a prime example of “reflexive” employment law (Hall, 2006), 
where legislation promotes voluntary adjustments to the employment relationship, 
employer interests would always dominate. Indeed, so employer-friendly were the 
Regulations that the CBI could celebrate the fact that the government had “made 
sense of a poor piece of EU legislation” (Hall, 2005: 103). 
methods, sources, Case Profiles
Thirteen semi-structured interviews, designed to achieve consistency in data 
acquisition and analysis, were conducted with full-time trade union officers, senior 
representatives and shop stewards between September 2006 and January 2007. 
Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and two hours and were recorded and 
transcribed. This evidence was complemented by company documentation, including 
feasibility studies, restructuring proposals, annual reports and ICE arrangements. 
Diverse union data—media briefings, members’ communications, alternative business 
plans, and correspondence—were collated and evaluated. 
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In addition, organizational contextual analysis is rooted in longitudinal case study 
research completed at five of the six firms. At Rolls-Royce Bristol the researchers 
have tracked changes in work organization, industrial relations practices and staff 
consultation processes over a nine-year period. Over this time the work has involved 
multiple site visits, questionnaire surveys of shop stewards and workers, interviews with 
sixteen senior managers and line managers, eight convenors, twenty shop stewards, 
fifty manual and non-manual workers and two full-time regional officers (Danford et 
al., 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005). At GM-Vauxhall, a similar longitudinal approach over 
a period of fourteen years was supplemented with recent interviews of convenor and 
deputy convenor, four stewards and two full-time officers (Amicus and TGWU) on the 
impact of ICE during the jobs crisis of May-June 2006 (Danford et al., 2008; Stewart 
et al., 2008). For more than a decade, one team member has conducted research in 
the financial services sector, notably in relation to organizational restructuring and 
the re-configuration of interactive service work in the form of call centres and the 
outcomes for employment relations and participation (Bain and Taylor, 2002; Taylor 
and Bain, 2001). Latterly, studies have considered the manifold consequences for 
employment levels and union representation arising from the growth of offshoring 
(Bain and Taylor, 2008; Taylor and Bain, 2005; 2006; 2008). Prior to examining the 
empirical evidence, we present summary profiles of the case companies (Table 1).
Table 1
profiles of Case Companies
Company bargaining union union(s) iCe Name of iC Restructuring/ 
 arrangements/ density  initiatives body redundancy 
 Recognition
peugeot-citroën full cb 95% amicus/ no* n/a closure of ryton, 
   t&g   2,300 redundancies
gm-vauxhall full cb 95% amicus/ no n/a termination of shift, 
   t&g   1,000 redundancies
prudential mixed - full 56% unionized  amicus pea employee closure of belfast 
 cb/no cb sites   forum and bristol sites
aviva limited 30% amicus employe your forum organization-wide 
 recognition/cb   forum   restructuring
marconi full cb 30% amicus/ pea forum crisis, takeover, 
   t&g/gmb   800 redundancies
rolls-royce full cb 100%  amicus/ pea uK information no specific 
  (manual),  t&g  and consultation initiative ongoing 
  70%    council restructuring 
  (non-manual)
* global framework agreement contained consultative mechanisms.
Motor Vehicle industry: Peugeot-Citroën and GM-Vauxhall
The UK car industry has been transformed within two decades under the impact of 
intensified competition, changes in corporate structure and ownership and extensive 
geographical re-location. Foreign-owned firms now dominate the UK, with almost 
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one-half of the 1.6m cars produced in 2005, manufactured by Japan’s “big three” of 
Honda, Nissan and Toyota (Financial Times, 19/4/06). By 2006 Peugeot-Citroën had 
one remaining manufacturing plant, at Ryton, which employed 2,300. Production 
since 1999 had focused exclusively on the 206 model, and an indication of declining 
demand had been the decision to end the third “C” shift in March 2005. By 2006 
GM-Vauxhall’s production, centred on the Astra (and small van variant), was confined 
to Ellesmere Port and a workforce of 3,000; the closure of GM’s Luton plant in 2002 
had sharply raised questions over Ellesmere Port’s future. 
At Ryton and Ellesmere Port, years of downsizing, closure threats, “whipsawing,” 
lean production and European and global corporate and product strategies (Stewart 
et al., 2008) had profoundly shaped the character of employment relations. While the 
workforces at both plants had remained solidly unionized (T&G majority, Amicus minority) 
and collective bargaining arrangements continued at national and plant levels, workplace 
organization inevitably had been weakened. Essentially a new politics of production 
prevailed in which, despite resistance and contestation particularly over pay, the unions 
had been compelled to accommodate to company demands over lean production, 
flexible working and productivity improvements. Stewart et al. (2008) demonstrate how 
at GM, through five successive company-union agreements, the promise of job security 
as the quid pro quo for flexibility and intensification proved illusory. 
Neither Peugeot nor GM took specific initiatives in anticipation of the ICE 
Regulations. In Peugeot’s case this neglect was not because the company was 
unaware of the potential implications following enforcement. Indeed, Amicus 
minutes of a special JNC meeting (24/03/05) to discuss termination of the “C” 
shift record Peugeot’s HR Director stating that “the information and consultation 
legislation had nothing to do with the timing of this decision.” In the view of 
the Amicus national officer, this amounted to a knowing avoidance of soon-to-
be enacted Regulations. “They did not consult over the change [and] came to us 
with a decision …” leaving the unions to negotiate only the voluntary redundancy 
package (Interview, 22/09/06). In GM’s case, ICE was never “on the radar.” 
There were additional dimensions to consultation. Peugeot’s Global Framework 
Agreement on Social Responsibility (Peugeot-Citroën, 2006a) promoted ten principles, 
including commitments on consultation and participation, particularly in respect of 
providing employees with regular and timely information on company operations 
and on issues affecting working conditions and employment. Employee participation 
initiatives were positively encouraged. This “global” commitment to social dialogue 
contrasts markedly with the absence of formal ICE arrangements in the UK. Insofar 
as consultation existed, it was confined to quality and quantity of production issues 
through monthly plant-level DCC meetings. Union officers in both companies 
contrasted the willingness to consult over productivity gains with restrictions on 
institutional access to strategic decision-making. 
Both companies gave promises regarding their plants’ immediate futures. In 
March 2005, Peugeot’s Chief Executive J.-M. Folz offered a personal commitment 
to the unions that Ryton would, as a minimum, continue to produce the 206 on 
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two shifts until 2010 (Amicus-TGWU, 2006) and Peugeot would consult over future 
plans. As late as January 2006 the Director of Corporate Communications had 
insisted that Peugeot “has a big industrial base in western Europe and there is no 
suggestion that we would shift that production” (JustAuto.com, 18/01/06). Ryton 
was “amongst the best of our plants” having made “tremendous improvements in 
productivity” and quality with “right first time [having] risen from 55% to 78%. 
Similarly, GM hailed Ellesmere Port’s success; the Astra achieved number two in UK 
sales (2006), following huge improvements in quality and Ellesmere Port was top 
of GM’s quality performance league (Weekly Team Brief, GM Manufacturing EP, 
03/07/06). Despite these assurances, peremptory decisions of closure (Ryton) and 
large-scale redundancies (Ellesmere Port) followed shortly thereafter. 
On 18 April 2006, Peugeot announced that production would end by mid-2007. 
Underpinning the decision was the building of additional capacity, equivalent to Ryton, 
with an investment of €350m at its new factory in Trnava, Slovakia. Production of 
the new 207 would commence in 2006 with other European plants fulfilling the 
outstanding requirements for the 206. The dominant motive of cost reduction driving 
relocation is revealed in company figures estimating manufacturing costs at €578 per 
vehicle lower in Trnava than in Ryton (Peugeot-Citroën, 2006b). Comparative pay rates, 
extrapolated for 2010, were calculated at €9.52 per hour for Trnava and €32.44 for 
Ryton. Given that significant strategic relocation requires years of planning, Peugeot 
undoubtedly had disregarded the need to consult employees at an early stage. 
Employees reacted with precisely the sense of shock that the Directive had been 
intended to obviate. 
I found out on the radio on the way to work. Neither the union nor management told us anything. 
We’re gutted. We’d heard rumours but no one had come out and told us what was happening, 
which makes me really angry (Alan Brown, Coventry Evening Telegraph, 19/04/06). 
Such responses reflected the company’s breach of promises to consult and the 
abrogation of its responsibilities under the Regulations. The company told national 
officers of “the decision taken not to source any new product into Ryton … at the 
same time as they informed the workforce” (National Officer, 22/09/06). In further 
contravention of the Regulations, presenting this restructuring initiative as a fait 
accompli prevented alternative courses of action from being pursued. Although 
the unions developed a case (Amicus-TGWU, 2006) based on Ryton’s profitability, 
comparative costs, social responsibility and flexibility, they were on the defensive, 
reacting to the “done deal” and striving unsuccessfully to persuade Peugeot to 
negotiate. The union also campaigned against Peugeot’s disregard of ICE, lobbying 
Alan Johnson (Secretary of State for Trade and Industry) who had been responsible 
for enacting the Regulations. 
Johnson’s response is significant in exposing weaknesses in regulatory enforcement 
and government unwillingness to challenge corporate decision-making. Although 
Johnson attacked Peugeot for backtracking on its promises, and claimed to have 
“pressed M. Folz to ensure that the company abided by its obligations under 
information and consultation legislation…to maintain a meaningful and constructive 
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dialogue with the Unions on their alternative plans” (Letter to unions, 26/04/06), his 
department’s position was to emphasize that closure was “a commercial matter for 
Peugeot” (DTI News Release, 18/04/06). Following discussions with local politicians, 
regional development agencies and unions regarding the “implications of your 
announcement” Johnson reassured Folz,
I have made it clear to them, as I have in my public comments on the issue, the UK Government’s 
appreciation that decisions such as this are ultimately a matter for the company (Letter, 20/04/06).
Thus, Peugeot’s decision and the manner of its making were justifiable because of 
inviolable market forces. Meaningful employee consultation, even when backed by 
statutory force, was subordinated to corporate interests. 
Paralleling developments at Peugeot, GM-Europe declared 1,000 redundancies at 
Ellesmere Port, cutting the third shift and reducing headcount to 2,000 (Financial Times, 
12/05/06). The workforce immediately responded with walkouts and “wildcat” strikes 
as GM rejected last-ditch proposals by European unions to “spread the pain” across 
plants in Belgium, German, Poland and Ellesmere Port. Despite the long-term threat to 
Ellesmere Port, GM’s rejection of the unions’ strategy nevertheless surprised the T&G 
and Amicus. A senior steward with over twenty-five years experience provided insight 
into the harsh consequences for UK employees of GM’s “global” corporate strategy. 
… there will never be a security of work agreement—how can there be? The unions will always find 
it hard to reach an agreement that actually protects, while the company is building more capacity 
into the eastern European plants—there is no agreement here … They have just announced 
700,000 capacity for two plants in Poland and Russia. Are the two plants for the eastern market 
only or for Europe as a whole? This is the contradiction in it all—take a shift out of Ellesmere Port 
because of overcapacity and at the same time build more capacity into the market. Scary stuff! 
(Interview, 04/04/06 cited in Stewart et al., 2008). 
On 20 May, the Plant Manager wrote to all workers explaining that the decision 
was due to “capacity adjustment” as the “most cost-efficient approach,” and that 
while there could be no guarantees of future production, failure to accept the 
redundancy programme would certainly lead to closure. Thus, in the period following 
the company’s announcement, just as in the months when GM had formulated its 
plans, no meaningful discussion took place with the unions. 
The company would say there was consultation, but we would say there wasn’t. The consultation 
came after they made the decision. “We will have you in and this is what is going to happen.” It 
was a consultation of how are we going to introduce it, how are we to get rid of people (Amicus 
officer, 16/11/06). 
These were the circumstances that ICE was intended to prevent. Yet, in both cases, 
the objectives of ensuring that employees have access to company information and 
participate in consultation over proposed business changes proved elusive. 
Finance Sector: Prudential and aviva 
A thoroughgoing transformation in the structure and dynamics of the financial services 
sector has also taken place in recent years. The Financial Services and Building Society 
Acts (1986) collapsed the distinctions between the banking, insurance and mortgage 
“an umbrella full of holes?” corporate restructuring, redundancy and the effectiveness of ice regulations 37
markets and precipitated trends to merger and acquisition (Morris et al., 2001). 
Prudential’s takeovers included Scottish Amicable (1997) and M&G (1999). Aviva was 
the re-branded name given to CGNU, the fusion of the Commercial General Union 
and Norwich Union (2000) both products of previous mergers. Driven by sector-wide 
intensified competition and pressures to maximize shareholder value, the Prudential 
and Aviva embarked on near-continuous programmes of restructuring, re-engineering 
and relocation aimed at slashing overheads and cutting costs. Central to these were 
technologically facilitated changes in the processes and loci of interactive servicing, 
notably the call centre’s emergence as the dominant mode of customer contact (Bain 
and Taylor, 2002), and the digitalization of the back-office (Miozzo and Soete, 2001). 
Both companies have been significant offshorers (Taylor and Bain, 2005). Without 
consultation, the Prudential decided to migrate 1,000 posts to Mumbai in September 
2002 and to close its Reading call centre but, following a vigorous Amicus campaign, 
conceded to a three-year “no compulsory redundancies” agreement (Amicus-
Prudential, 2002). From late-2003 Aviva moved call centre and back-office posts to 
three Indian third-party suppliers, but from 2006 has transferred them to a wholly 
owned subsidiary, Aviva Global Services. By 2008, 7,800 jobs will be located in India 
(Norwich Union, 2006a). Thus, in terms of company strategy, restructuring within the 
UK has become inextricably connected to the expansion of offshoring. By mid-2006 
Prudential, as the second largest UK life insurance and pensions provider, had more 
than 7 million customers and employed around 6,000.6 Aviva, the UK’s largest and 
the world’s fifth largest insurance company, employed 36,000 in its UK operations. 
Prudential’s industrial relations are dichotomous. While recognizing Amicus for 
collective bargaining at its Reading, Belfast, Bristol and London sites, where overall 
union density was 56% (Interview seconded rep, 09/10/06), Prudential has resisted 
union attempts to extend recognition to Craigforth and Derby. Motivated by a desire 
to exclude Amicus, according to reps, the company continued at Craigforth to operate 
the paternalistic consultative body, the Employee Forum (EF), inherited from Scottish 
Amicable. The EF offered a soft consultative alternative potentially extendable across 
the company at the expense of Amicus and its reps network. Crucially, a divided 
workforce would weaken company-wide resistance to further restructuring. At Aviva, 
Amicus has a “Procedure and Facilities Agreement” giving representation rights, but 
is not accorded recognition for collective bargaining. This limited entitlement largely 
results from historical union weakness in Aviva’s constituent companies. Further, the 
employers used merger to dilute the harder form of collectivism as represented by 
MSF-Amicus. The Norwich Union merger enabled management to recast industrial 
relations “from formal recognition to a partnership agreement which did not have 
recognition” (Interview seconded rep, 30/10/06). 
Against this background of these attempts to reduce union influence, both 
Prudential and Aviva introduced ICE arrangements anticipating the ICE Regulations’ 
enactment. Prudential established an “Employee Forum” with a written constitution 
through a PEA which conformed to the Regulations (Prudential, 2004). Although 
riddled with imprecision regarding the Forum’s remit and its relationship to collective 
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bargaining, the “Forum’s Purpose” appeared unambiguous: providing elected 
representatives with “regular [bi-annual] updates on issues affecting the business and 
employees (para. 4.2), guaranteeing annual reviews [para. 4.3] and commitments 
to “consultation” and dialogue. Pessimistically, though, union reps perceived 
management’s motivations as twofold: formal compliance with Regulations and 
weakening collective organization as Prudential pursued further restructuring and 
offshoring, following the ending of the job security agreement. 
Aviva established “Your Forum” (YF) in November 2004 without workforce approval, 
claiming that with union density at 30%, YF would provide representation for 70% of 
employees. Unsurprisingly, then, Amicus saw Aviva’s legislative compliance as a further 
attempt to “sideline the union.” YF’s configuration reflected Aviva’s organizational 
structure as separate forums were created for different businesses (e.g., Life Forum). 
From the beginning, union reps elected to the YF reported Aviva’s unwillingness to 
engage in meaningful consultation (Interview national officer, 30/10/06). 
Union suspicions regarding respective company motives regarding ICE initiatives 
were confirmed. On 26 April 2006, Prudential announced £40m cost savings, to be 
delivered by a “locational strategy” involving 700 redundancies, including the closure 
of Belfast and Bristol and job losses at London and Reading. The majority of the work 
would be transferred to Mumbai, but Craigforth would receive 200 jobs (Financial 
Times, 27/04/06). Compulsory redundancies were unavoidable. Amicus perceived this 
restructuring as anti-union as it involved transferring work from union-dense (Belfast 
70%) to non-union locations (Mumbai, Craigforth, Derby). During the period when 
Prudential was formulating plans, no attempts were made to inform the workforce, 
the union or the EF, let alone engage in the promised “dialogue and exchange of views 
and a debate undertaken in good faith.” Amicus was verbally informed on 24 April, 
with written notification given on 26 April, 15 minutes before hastily arranged staff 
briefings, by which time news of the redundancies had already been made public. 
Reps recalled how they had been presented with a fait accompli, although the 
company maintained that consultation was only beginning. 
Certainly, what they said to us on the Monday was “This is a proposal, so the 90-day consultation 
period starts now.” However, once you have announced to the staff and the wider world that 
something is going to happen then it is not really a proposal. And particularly once you have gone 
to the City, which they did on the Wednesday morning and explained the cost savings, it wasn’t 
really consultation. To me, consultation should take place at the idea stage, so once they had an 
idea that they were thinking of closing Belfast down and needed to make cost savings, that’s when 
they should have been talking to us (Senior seconded rep, 09/10/06). 
Prudential’s unilateral decision-making foreclosed the exploration of alternatives 
involving Amicus or EF representatives. Nevertheless, the union produced detailed 
counter-proposals (Amicus, 2006) based on similar cost savings, but without recourse 
to compulsory redundancies and Belfast’s closure. Significantly, Prudential did not 
differentiate between the EF and Amicus in that neither established collective 
bargaining mechanisms nor were the new arrangements used to communicate 
with or involve employees. “There was no added level of consultation through the 
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Forum as had been promised” (Senior seconded rep, 09/10/06). Ultimately, the EF’s 
dependence on senior management rendered it incapable of acting on behalf of 
employees. This contrasted with Amicus’ involvement in complex negotiations which 
led to Belfast’s purchase by Capita, by which 450 jobs were transferred under the 
terms of the transfer of undertakings legislation (TUPE) (Capita, 2006). 
Similarly, on 14 September Aviva announced 4,000 job losses (with 600 offshored) 
of which 50% would be compulsory redundancies. The rationale was the need to 
create a “leaner organization” delivering, for example, £125m cost savings for the 
Life business (Norwich Union, 2006b). Amicus was informed of the decision “fifteen 
minutes before [it] was announced to the stock market.” Where YF was concerned, 
Aviva strove, almost literally, to contain its ability to discuss, or reveal, details of the 
redundancies. Management had organized a Forum meeting on the day of the 
announcement which commenced at 8 a.m. 
… a lot of the forum reps walked into that meeting and were flabbergasted because they didn’t 
anticipate what was happening. They then more or less locked us into the room till 10 o’clock 
… because the Stock Exchange were being told then … They are using the excuse of the Stock 
Exchange, that they legally can’t speak to us before they have spoken to them, but that’s not true 
(seconded rep, 30/10/06). 
As with the Prudential, Aviva claimed it was commencing “a programme of formal 
consultation” (Norwich Union, 2006a). However, as a rep insisted, “until you consult 
it should be a proposal” and the announcement was tantamount to an irrevocable 
decision. 
Prudential and Aviva are typical of much of the financial services sector where 
unprecedented restructuring has resulted in wholesale redundancies. Rather than 
offering some protection for employees, even at the modest level of information 
provision, consultation initiatives appeared to be motivated by minimal regulatory 
compliance and the desire to constrain unions’ ability to contest restructuring strategies. 
In both instances, the I & C bodies spectacularly failed their first major tests. Reflecting 
on the broader significance of the Regulations, Aviva’s national officer commented,
I guess ICE allows them to set up the forums. Having the forums allows them to sideline the 
union. And, having sidelined the union, when an announcement like the 4,000 job cuts is made, 
they don’t have to engage with the union but, in reality, neither did they have to engage with the 
forums that they had set up.
Electronics/telecommunications Sectors: Marconi 
During the 1990s, the electronics company Marconi (formerly part of GEC) re-branded 
itself as a high-tech telecommunications specialist. Selling off stable revenue-generating 
sectors such as defence, it purchased extensively overseas (BBC News Online, 09/04/01). 
This strategic change proved disastrous, coinciding with over-capacity in telecoms 
markets, a worldwide slowdown and the burst of the dot.com bubble. As Marconi’s 
major customers drastically reduced equipment budgets, the company’s failure to 
diversify hit hard. Its value fell to £50m from £34bn before the dotcom crash. Between 
2000 and 2005 Marconi shed 20,000 jobs globally and shrank its UK workforce to 
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4,300. A further massive setback was the failure in 2005 of British telecoms giant BT to 
include Marconi in the shortlist of suppliers chosen to develop “21st Century Network” 
(21CN) equipment, despite BT being Marconi’s biggest and most significant customer. 
The share price plummeted at the news and major redundancies loomed. On 3 May 
2005 the company agreed to consult the unions before any decisions were made but, 
on 6 May, it suddenly announced 800 redundancies and the closure of its Liverpool 
plant (The Guardian, 07/05/05). In October, Ericsson bought Marconi’s operational 
side, retaining 3,000 workers in the UK. The small remainder of Marconi, re-named 
Telent, was reconfigured as a services provider for telecoms companies. 
Across Marconi union membership had remained at around 30%, with Amicus 
the major union and additional membership in the T&G and GMB, and the company 
had a long-established practice of site-based bargaining. Prior to 2005 there were 
no I & C arrangements, not even a European Works Council (EWC), despite Marconi 
plants in Italy and Germany.7 Then, abruptly, in January 2005 Marconi announced that 
it was establishing a forum through the PEA route. Suspicions that union exclusion 
was the motivation were confirmed by the fact that only two weeks were allowed 
for representatives’ nominations and elections. Unions were not consulted about the 
arrangements, nor given a written copy of the constitution. Since the Forum’s fifteen 
constituencies were based on business units, the effect was to minimize unions’ site-
based representation, locking the union into a minority of constituencies. It was only 
after the elections that Marconi presented a constitution to the forum using the post 
hoc signatories of its reps to claim workforce approval. The Amicus national officer 
insisted that the intention was to by-pass the unions. 
They started to put company policies through this forum; not pay and conditions but they clearly 
were going to use it, not to get agreement, but to wave proposed policies in front of them. The 
only thing that stopped that happening was after April, and the whole future of Marconi … then 
everything was blown out of the water (Interview, 29/11/06).
Significantly, the Forum was not warned of the forthcoming redundancies. Unlike 
Amicus which used its external profile and access to government departments and 
ministers, 
… the information and consultation body itself was hardly involved at all in the serious issues. Very, 
very, superficial involvement. Ironically, we [the union] probably got more information from the 
company than the consultation body (Interview, 29/11/06).
A final issue concerns the non-disclosure of information, where the company 
cited confidentiality and the Stock Exchange rules as reasons.8 That Marconi’s actions 
were taken for tactical rather than regulatory reasons is evidenced by the fact that 
anonymous briefings about likely bidders were given to the financial press. 
They were using the press to say things they weren’t telling the unions, the I & C body, or the 
workforce. So, when it was in their interests, they were quite happy to publicise stuff and give 
information out, not to the unions but the press to maximize their sale price (Interview, 29/11/06).
In sum, the introduction of a PEA with no prior consultation indicates minimal 
regulatory compliance and union marginalization. In the event, its establishment 
coincided with Marconi’s crisis and it is noteworthy that the forum was not considered 
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suitable for communicating with employees nor for discussing the implications for 
jobs of Ericsson’s takeover. Evidently the Regulations made little impact on company 
actions in the wake of the company’s crisis. Initial promises to consult were short-
circuited as Marconi decided unilaterally to close plants and enforce redundancies. 
aerospace/Engineering industry: rolls-royce 
Rolls-Royce is one of the two leading global suppliers of gas turbines and power 
systems for aircraft, marine and energy use. In 2005, the company employed 34,488 
workers worldwide, nearly 21,000 in the UK. At its Bristol plant, this case study’s locus, 
restructuring halved employee numbers to 4,000 between 1995 and 2005. Bristol has 
been subject to two salient drivers of change, emanating from a shifting economic 
environment characterized by intense global competition and the ability of customers to 
exert significant price reductions (Danford et al., 2005). Firstly, the plant was reorganized 
from a unitary division responsible for manufacturing military aero-engines into a more 
complex matrix structure of “customer-focused business units” (profit centres), deigned 
to reduce (particularly labour) costs. It created managerial pressure to fragment site-
wide collective bargaining by devolution to these units (Danford et al., 2002). Secondly, 
management’s “make-buy” strategy has involved downsizing and cutting labour costs 
by subcontracting key design and manufacturing work packages.
Collective bargaining arrangements were conventional as the manual and non-
manual unions divided into bargaining groups. Amicus dominated both and union 
density was 100% and 70% respectively (Interview convenor, 22/10/06). Discussions 
on policy issues, such as company strategy and staffing levels, were covered by 
multi-tiered consultative forums comprising bi-weekly meetings with HR managers, 
monthly meetings with the corporate director of operations, quarterly meetings of 
management and union representatives in the largest business unit, Defence Europe, 
and twice-yearly meetings of a Global Council.9 Meetings with HR managers and the 
director of operations were new informal forums arising from the implementation of 
a Modern Working Practices Agreement (MWPA). Full-time officers were excluded 
from all consultative committees except the Global Council, conditions regarded as 
restricting union influence (Full time officer, 22/10/06).
Immediately following the Regulations’ enactment, Rolls-Royce established a UK 
Information and Consultation Council. Its remit was to provide early consultation on 
business issues affecting employees and to provide information and consultation, 
enabling opinions to be considered before decisions were reached (Rolls-Royce, 
2006). Its terms of reference were agreed by a national negotiating committee of 
managers and senior union representatives prior to “technical” consultation with the 
workforce, but no ballot was held to endorse it. The Council included 29 employee 
representatives from the eight largest plants (all union nominees and virtually all shop 
stewards), plus three covering smaller sites. 
Since the Council’s institution there have been no redundancies in Rolls-Royce’s UK 
plants to test the robustness of its founding principles of joint consultation and advance 
warning. Nevertheless, management has used the Council to engender a strategic shift 
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attempting to change the locales of collective bargaining and replace bargaining with 
weaker consultation. Pursuing business-unit level bargaining on the micro-processes 
of policy implementation, such as MWPA, was accompanied by shifting discussions on 
terms and conditions (traditionally covered by site-wide collective bargaining) to the 
National Council. Management’s ability to achieve this shift was partly aided by the 
unions having understandably placed less experienced stewards on the Council, seeing 
it initially as another burdensome layer of consultation. Consequently, management 
found it easier to ignore the consultation process completely when it suited them, or 
to raise issues governing changes to terms and conditions on the Council agenda, and 
once “consultation” had taken place to implement changes.10
Redundancy agreements and standardized conditions provide examples 
of management’s attempt to use the National Council to replace plant-based 
negotiations with weak national consultation. The catalyst was the company’s 
response to the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. It claimed that the 
existing redundancy agreement contravened the regulations by offering unequal 
terms dependent on age. Management sought to alter the agreement, in effect a 
change to terms and conditions, by raising the issue at National Council, rather than 
attempting formal negotiation with site unions. Similarly, management was seeking 
to effect inter-site standardization of non-pay related terms and conditions (sick 
pay and compassionate leave) by discussion at Council rather than through union 
negotiations. One convenor commented:
So they used the ageism document to change the redundancy document and they unilaterally just 
changed it without any reference back to us at all. It was all one way and HR blamed the UK Council. 
They said they consulted with them, but it was all one-way consultation, there was nothing coming 
back the other way. They just said they were going to use the ageism document even further to 
standardize sick pay schemes, leave of absence, to just standardize everything … So our collective 
bargaining rights are going to disappear under that document (Manual convenor, 22/10/06).
However, union protestations forced the company to retreat and place the issue on 
the plant bargaining agenda. Given that the period since the forum’s introduction has 
not seen the company propose redundancies, Rolls-Royce’s consultative arrangements 
have not been subject to the most meaningful test of their effectiveness. Nevertheless, 
a clear pattern has emerged of attempts to exploit ICE in order to substitute national 
consultation for plant bargaining. Management suggests that the prospects are not 
favourable that Rolls-Royce will engage in meaningful consultation, when forthcoming 
restructuring initiatives occasion further redundancies. 
Conclusions
The evidence presented exposes major faultlines in the effectiveness of UK’s ICE 
Regulations to provide employees with even the most limited protection against 
corporate plans to reorganize production and make wholesale redundancies. In five 
cases, companies failed to inform or consult with their employees regarding their future 
employment. Explicitly in three cases (Prudential, Aviva, Marconi), and potentially in 
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another (Rolls-Royce), consultative arrangements provided opportunities to by-pass 
or undermine the union. In the finance sector, arrangements were introduced in part 
because of the coincidental need to weaken collective resistance to restructuring. 
In motor manufacturing, unions were simply ignored in circumstances where no 
consultative mechanisms had been established. In practice, companies treated unions 
and consultative forums with similar disdain. Contrary to management claims, ICE-
inspired mechanisms have not provided added levels of representation either to 
complement unions, or to fill the “representation gap” left by declining membership. 
In all five cases involving job loss the workforces were presented with a fait accompli, 
in contravention of the supposed requirement that consultation should occur at the 
anticipatory stage. The Amicus officer for the electronics industry commented on this 
deficit. 
Consultation, whether it’s to do with redundancy or health and safety or broad information and 
consultation, is not meaningful unless the trade union and those representing the workforce have 
the opportunity and the ability to make the company reconsider its proposals. So my view is that, 
whether it’s a trade union in its own right or an I&C body, we should be involved at the “glint in the 
eye stage”, before decisions are made—before they’ve gone through the board or senior executive 
committee … (Interview, 29/11/06).
This failure to consult raises wider questions about the wider political and legislative 
environment in the UK, where the law apparently allows companies peremptorily to 
make workers redundant. Amicus General Secretary Derek Simpson complained to 
Alan Johnson over Ryton’s closure, that ministers were “limited in the support that 
they could give because they have created the regime which has allowed the company 
to behave like this” (The Times, 21/04/06); British workers were being sacrificed in the 
interests of maintaining “a flexible labour market” (The Guardian, 19/04/06). 
Essentially, the Directive’s transposition involved the “de-Europeanization” of the 
idea of worker consultation. In continental Europe, the development of consultative 
structures (e.g., works councils) has represented the idea that labour rights, such 
as joining a union or being consulted and informed, are basic human rights and an 
extension of the principles of democracy. The UK’s failure is ultimately a political failure 
as the government opposed the ICE Directive in principle and, under the impact of 
employers’ influence, produced Regulations that significantly diluted what, even in 
the original, were hardly radical proposals. 
Growing union concerns regarding ICE should be rooted in a critical understanding 
of developments in UK employment legislation since 1997, which locate the ICE 
Regulations in Labour’s subordination of its social-democratic heritage to neo-
liberalism (Smith and Morton, 2006). Not only are there limitations in the statutory 
union-recognition procedures of the Employment Relations Act, but Labour, despite 
its swift reversal of the Conservative’s derogation of the “social chapter” of the Treaty 
of Maastricht (1992), has consistently remained sceptical of the European model of 
a regulated labour market. As Fairness at Work stated, “Some aspects of the social 
models developed in Europe before the advent of global markets have arguably 
become incompatible with competitiveness” (DTI, 1998: 10). Labour has continued 
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policies of delaying and diluting EC Directives and then implementing them in a 
minimalist manner. 
Clearly no amount of consultation or information will halt the process of capitalist 
reconstruction and relocation. However, the evidence from continental Europe shows 
that “Social Dialogue” in such circumstances can ameliorate the shock and allow 
a more ordered and negotiated transition in which unions and workplace reps can 
at least attempt to secure the best deal for their members. Given that ICE can be 
effective only insofar as the broader labour law regime allows, the “liberal” character 
of UK legislation places unions at a strategic disadvantage. Specifically, the absence of 
mechanisms of enforcement and of social and institutional deterrents leaves unions 
and the workers they represent vulnerable to companies’ unilateral decisions. The 
Amicus officer for the motor vehicle industry observed of ICE that, “It’s a dog with no 
teeth, it barks a lot but it ain’t going to bite you if you are not frightened of it.” All the 
trade unionists interviewed were emphatic that a reversal of policy and the restoration 
of collectivism are required to give workers some safeguards against the perpetual 
processes of corporate restructuring that increasingly jeopardize their livelihood. To 
date, the Regulations have failed to put an end to the sorry tales of workers hearing 
on car radios on their way to work that they have lost their jobs. 
Notes
1 Non-EU readers should note that the European Union itself does not make law; the European 
Commission passes Directives which then have to be turned into national legislation 
(transposition) in the individual member states.
2 In 2008 Amicus completed its merger with the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) 
to form Unite.
3 Though, as we demonstrate, not in the case of Rolls-Royce.
4 The UK, Ireland and Italy were the only EU states lacking laws or legally-binding national 
agreements placing a duty on employers to inform and consult with employee representatives 
on economic and employment issues.
5 Initially applying to undertakings of 150 employees but extending to undertakings with at 
least 100 employees (6 April 2007) and 50 employees (6 April 2008).
6 It had 3m additional customers at its internet-based operation Egg which employed 3,000.
7 As Amicus already represented Ericsson workers, the subsequent sale presented few 
organising problems. Ericsson had an I & C body, although much weaker than its Swedish 
equivalent, and an EWC.
8 The UK’s Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) makes it clear that Stock 
Exchange “Listing Rules” rarely justify a blanket restriction on information and consultation 
on commercial matters. They differentiate between employees and employee reps so that 
price sensitive information can be given to reps in confidence before the market is notified.
9 The Rolls-Royce PLC Global Council, established in 2005, replaced the hybrid EWC. According 
to the Convenor, consultation at GC did not offer meaningful union influence over company 
decision-making.
10 Interviews reveal several instances involving such as the use of agency labour, changes to a 
redundancy agreement, the standardisation of UK conditions, the payment of holiday pay to 
retirees and job transfers.
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rÉsumÉ
Un parapluie percé ? Restructurations d’entreprise, 
licenciements et efficacité de l’application au Royaume-Uni  
de la Directive européenne sur l’information et la consultation 
des travailleurs
Notre article porte sur l’application au Royaume-Uni de la Directive de l’Union 
européenne relative à l’information et la consultation des travailleurs (ICT, en anglais 
« ICE »). Nous examinons les effets de cette mesure peu contraignante de gestion des 
ressources humaines dans le contexte impitoyable des restructurations, licenciements 
et fermetures d’entreprise. L’entrée en vigueur de la réglementation ICT au Royaume-
Uni en avril 2005 a été présentée comme un progrès important en matière de droit 
de l’emploi et de relations du travail. Cette réglementation offrait en effet pour la 
première fois un cadre législatif accordant aux travailleurs le droit à l’information et à 
la consultation concernant l’emploi et les restructurations.
La fermeture précipitée par Renault de son usine de Vilvoorde en Belgique en 1997 
a mis au jour des lacunes dans la législation européenne en matière de licenciements 
collectifs et de droits des travailleurs. C’est cela qui a poussé la Commission européenne 
à formuler cette Directive. La réglementation britannique a donc pour origine une 
tentative de l’UE d’empêcher les licenciements-chocs et d’encourager les entreprises à 
informer et à consulter les employés et leurs représentants sur les décisions majeures 
concernant leur emploi. Notre article permet de comparer les implications du type 
néolibéral britannique de marché du travail avec le modèle de marché social de 
l’Europe continentale. Les gouvernements travaillistes britanniques n’ont eu cesse de 
bloquer l’application de la Directive au niveau de l’UE, et ils en ont amoindri les effets 
puisque les employeurs ne sont plus obligés d’informer ni de consulter. La transposition 
de la Directive européenne a achevé d’en diluer l’effet.
La version finale de la réglementation britannique avait pour objectif non de donner 
plus de droits aux employés, mais d’intégrer le point de vue des employeurs, et 
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plus particulièrement du syndicat patronal CBI, opposé à tout modèle participatif, 
et inébranlable dans sa volonté de maintenir la flexibilité du marché du travail. En 
conséquence, cette réglementation est peu contraignante et ne représente qu’une 
extension du contexte volontariste britannique où les intérêts des employeurs passent 
en premier. Certains vont jusqu’à avancer que la réglementation britannique ne fait que 
légitimer un mode de communication dont les syndicats sont exclus.
Notre étude porte sur le cas de six entreprises (Peugeot-Citroën, General Motors, 
Prudential, Aviva, Marconi, Rolls-Royce) issues de quatre secteurs (construction 
automobile, services financiers, électronique et aérospatiale). Nous examinons des 
entretiens approfondis et semi-structurés avec des syndicalistes, des cadres et des 
délégués syndicaux, ainsi qu’une abondante documentation concernant les entreprises 
et les syndicats. Nous avons choisi ces entreprises avant tout en raison de licenciements 
massifs postérieurs à l’entrée en vigueur de la réglementation britannique, et 
d’inquiétudes soulevées par le syndicat Amicus (devenu Unite).
Cet article met en lumière d’importantes failles dans l’efficacité de la réglementation 
ICT lorsqu’il s’agit de protéger les employés contre les entreprises qui réorganisent 
la production et licencient massivement. Cinq des entreprises n’ont ni informé ni 
consulté leurs employés. Dans trois cas sinon quatre, les dispositions consultatives 
ont carrément fourni à l’entreprise une occasion d’éviter de passer par le syndicat, 
sapant ainsi son influence. Dans le secteur des services financiers, l’introduction de 
dispositions inspirées de la réglementation ICT a contribué à affaiblir la résistance 
collective des syndicats aux restructurations et aux délocalisations. Dans le secteur 
automobile, où aucun mécanisme ICT n’avait été mis en place, on a carrément 
passé outre aux syndicats. Contrairement à ce qu’ont prétendu les employeurs, les 
dispositions ICT n’ont pas amélioré la représentativité en aidant le travail des syndicats 
ou en compensant le déclin du taux de syndicalisation. Dans les cinq entreprises qui 
ont effectué des licenciements, les employés ont été mis devant le fait accompli, en 
violation de la soi-disant obligation de les consulter à l’avance.
Ce manque de consultation soulève d’importantes questions sur le contexte politique 
et législatif britannique en général, où la loi semble permettre aux entreprises de 
licencier les travailleurs sans plus de façon. En fait, la transposition de la Directive 
revient à une « déseuropéanisation » du concept de consultation des travailleurs. 
L’échec du Royaume-Uni en la matière est d’ordre politique puisque le gouvernement 
a apporté une opposition de principe à la Directive européenne et a introduit 
une réglementation qui affaiblissait considérablement des propositions déjà peu 
révolutionnaires. Les inquiétudes exprimées par les syndicats devant la réglementation 
ICT trouvent leur origine dans une analyse critique de l’évolution de la législation 
britannique sur l’emploi depuis 1997, plaçant cette réglementation dans le contexte 
de la subordination par le parti travailliste de son héritage social-démocrate au 
néolibéralisme. Les gouvernements travaillistes n’ont fait que poursuivre la politique 
de leurs prédécesseurs conservateurs en freinant et en diluant l’efficacité de la 
Directive européenne, puis en l’appliquant de manière minimaliste.
Il va sans dire qu’aucune mesure de consultation et d’information ne peut stopper le 
processus de reconstruction et de relocation capitalistes. Ce qui se passe en Europe 
continentale montre cependant que le dialogue social peut amortir le choc et faciliter 
une transition négociée, où syndicats et représentants des travailleurs peuvent tenter 
d’obtenir de meilleures conditions. Le caractère « libéral » de la législation britannique 
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met les syndicats en position de faiblesse stratégique. Plus particulièrement, l’absence 
d’un mécanisme de mise en application livre les syndicats et les travailleurs aux décisions 
unilatérales des entreprises. La réglementation ICT n’a pas réussi à empêcher que de 
malheureux travailleurs britanniques entendent sur leur radio d’auto en se rendant à 
leur travail qu’ils venaient d’être licenciés.
MOTS-CLéS : Union européenne, information et consultation des employés, Royaume-Uni, 
fermeture d’usine
resumen
¿“Un paraguas lleno de huecos”? Restructuración empresarial, 
reducción de personal y eficacia de las regulaciones ICE
Este artículo se interesa a la manera como la directiva de la Unión Europea sobre la 
información y la consultación de los empleados (ICE) ha sido empleada en el Reino 
Unido en las duras condiciones empresariales de restructuración, reducción de personal 
y cierre de fabrica. Basándose en entrevistas y material documentario de seis compañías 
(Peugeot-Citroën, general Motors, Prudential, Aviva, Marcono, Rolls Royce), el artículo 
presenta las principales fallas de eficiencia de las regulaciones ICE en el Reino-Unido 
para ofrecer una protección aunque sea limitada a los empleados que enfrentan la 
reducción de personal como un hecho consumado. Contrariamente a las alegaciones de 
la patronal, los convenios ICE no han procurado niveles adicionales de representación 
en complemento a los sindicatos ni  un medio de cubrir el vacío de representación 
dejado por el deterioro de la cobertura. El fracaso de consultación plantea más amplias 
preguntas en el vasto contexto político y legislativo en el Reino-Unido.
PALABRAS CLAVES : Unión europea, información y consultación de empleados, Reino 
Unido, cierre de fabricas
